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NEW CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
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The federal writ of habeas corpus has become virtually a sovereign
remedy for state prisoners who seek to upset their convictions on
constitutional grounds. Contrary to earlier practice, failure to ob-
serve state procedural requirements for presenting constitutional
claims rarely is a bar to a federal habeas proceeding. The next major
development may be a "federalization" and relaxation of many rules
of state procedure, as a matter of fourteenth amendment interpreta-
tion.
It is a unique characteristic of American federalism that within
each territorial jurisdiction there exists a dual system of courts, each
having a part in enforcing the laws of the other authority. Federal courts
apply state law in the exercise of their diversity and pendent jurisdic-
tions, and state courts apply federal law, including the United States
Constitution, in a kaleidoscopic variety of cases. Not only do local
courts apply national law and vice versa, but as a general matter litiga-
tion begins and ends in the same system of courts. When a question of
state law arises in a federal court action, its determination, with some
exceptions,1 is in the hands of that tribunal and there is no opportunity
for review by a state court, even though it is conceded that the state ap-
pellate courts speak with ultimate authority on matters of state law.
Similarly, when an issue of federal law arises in state court litigation, its
final resolution more often than not is left to the local courts. In many
circumstances, it is true, there can be review in the United States
Supreme Court,' but attempts to secure such review are episodic
and success is rare. Too, under certain conditions state court litigation
involving federal questions can be removed to the federal district
courts.' But the basic configuration of our judicial federalism has been
as we have described it: unicameral litigation notwithstanding over-
lapping jurisdiction.
* Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
1 Where unconstrued state law is challenged on federal constitutional grounds, the
"abstention" doctrine furnishes a means for obtaining clarification from the state court.
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). This device is not
generally available in diversity-of-citizenship litigation. Compare Meredith v. City of
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), with Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thi-
bodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1966).
3 See generally Wright, Federal Courts 110-26 (1963).
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However, the proposition that state court determinations of fed-
eral rights usually go unreviewed by federal courts needs to be qualified
drastically in reference to state criminal litigation. Since the Hughes
era, and with frenetic energy in the past several years, the Supreme
Court has greatly expanded the fourteenth amendment rights of per-
sons charged and tried under state criminal laws. Pari passu with this
catalogue of newly recognized constitutional protections has been an
enlargement of the federal writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction
process available to state prisoners who raise claims of violation of
their federal rights by the police, prosecutor, or defense counsel, or
by the rulings of the trial or appellate courts of the state.
It is clear that the Constitution does not require every federal
question, including those raised by state prisoners, to be heard at some
stage of litigation in a federal court.4 Equally plain is the proposition
that nothing in the Constitution inhibits Congress from providing a
federal forum if it so chooses; that is to say, from extending the juris-
diction of federal courts to the outermost limits of Article III.
Relief under federal habeas corpus is thus a matter of statutory
provision. But some statutes fashion a government in ways as funda-
mental as constitutions. The Habeas Corpus Act, virtually unmodified
since its adoption in 1867, is such a statute.5 The cases under it rank
with Erie R.R. v. Tompkins6 (an interpretation of the Rules of Deci-
sion Act)' as among the most profoundly consequential of the Court's
decisions.
This article is concerned with how and why the lower federal
courts have been projected pell-mell into the administration of state
criminal justice, and what a federal forum of regular resort means for
state procedures which are less hospitable to federal claims than is
habeas itself.
I. QUESTIONS TRIABLE ON HABEAS
In its most limited use as a post-conviction process, federal habeas
corpus questions the "jurisdiction" of the court or courts by whose
sentence the prisoner is held but does not inquire into allegations of
mere "error." For over a century that is how habeas as a remedy for
federal convicts was understood. In perhaps the earliest Supreme
Court expression on the subject, Ex parte Watkins,8 it was said: "An
imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful unless that judg-
ment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has
4 But see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406 (1963).
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1959).
6 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1966).
8 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830).
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general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be erroneous."
Words to the same effect have been used by the Court on countless
subsequent occasions, and as recently as 1947 it was held that only
errors that "cross the jurisdictional line" are cognizable on habeas.'
The meaning of "jurisdiction" in criminal proceedings is, at best, un-
clear. Were it strictly coextensive with the power to make decisions,
the occasions would be negligible when a criminal court would be found
to lack power over the person of the accused or competence to try viola-
tions of the penal law. But during the Watkins century habeas was used
successfully, for example, to challenge the constitutionality of the stat-
ute creating an offense 10 and the legality of sentence imposed--im-
portant questions to be sure, but matters having more to do with
propriety than power of decision. Nevertheless, a claimed violation of
the self-incrimination provisions of the fifth amendment, which also
is an important matter, was dismissed as non-jurisdictional and hence
unsuitable for habeas. 2 A classification of questions held to be juris-
dictional once was attempted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,13 but his
effort tended rather to accentuate than reduce the tohubohu of past
decisions.
Perhaps the most enterprising interpretations of the cases of the
habeas-tests-only-jurisdiction era are those recently advanced by
Justices Brennan and Harlan in Fay v. Noia.'4 That they are in total
conflict is only to say that legal history, no less than general history, is
a creative art. 5 Mr. Justice Brennan suggests that the Court's actions,
far more aggressive than the Watkins formula would indicate, confirm
that habeas always was available for the determination of serious con-
stitutional claims. The apparent exceptions, such as the self-incrimina-
tion case just mentioned, are marked off as situations in which the Court
regarded the substantive claim as near frivolous and preferred to rest
rejection on lack of jurisdiction. From his reading of the case law,
Justice Brennan draws positive support for the proposition that "re-
straints contrary to our fundamental law, the Constitution, may be
challenged on federal habeas corpus even though imposed pursuant to
9 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 179 (1947).
10 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
11 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (1 Wall.) 163 (1873).
12 Matter of Moran, 203 U.S. 96 (1906).
13 Sunal v. Large, supra note 9, at 185-87 (dissenting opinion).
14 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
15 But see Mayers, "The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal
Historian," 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 31 (1965), and Oaks, "Legal History in the High Court
Habeas Corpus," 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451 (1966), challenging Mr. Justice Brennan's histori-
ography.
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the conviction of a federal court of competent jurisdiction"'--a prin-
ciple flatly at odds with the language of scores of decisions but never-
theless one which the Justice believes was inchoate in those same
decisions. Mr. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, is content to take
the jurisdictional limitation at face value. The anomalies, he concludes,
are not evidence of a latent and wholly different principle of collateral
review but merely manifestations of a natural desire to afford some
kind of examination of federal criminal convictions at a time when
there was no statutory provision for direct appeal."
The early uses of federal habeas corpus as a remedy for state
prisoners provide another fertile source of divergent interpretations.
The 1867 statute in terms extended the writ to all persons held in
custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.""' To the question whether the claimed violation of
federal rights had to rise to jurisdictional magnitude, Justices Brennan
and Harlan again offer conflicting analyses of the cases. Mr. Justice
Brennan finds the jurisdictional limitation rejected by implication in
the exhaustion-of-remedies cases, beginning with Ex parte Royall.19
Those decisions introduced and developed the requirement that state
prisoners must seek vindication of their federal rights through all
available procedures in the state courts before resorting to the federal
remedy of habeas. Such a doctrine, Mr. Justice Brennan argues, pre-
supposes that after state remedies have been pursued the same issues
are then open to decision in the federal court. And since the Court did
not specifically restrict the class of federal claims for which exhaustion
was required, it follows, so the argument goes, that no restrictions ever
were intended. But there are other decisions, on which Mr. Justice Har-
lan relies for his thesis that the scope of habeas in the beginning did not
go beyond jurisdictional defects in the state court proceedings. Among
them are cases holding that claims of racial exclusion of jurors were
not cognizable on habeas, even though the allegations presented meri-
torious federal issues for purposes of direct review20 In some of these
cases, moreover, there are explicit Watkins-type statements about
"jurisdiction."'
Frank v. Mangum,2 decided in 1915, is universally considered a
benchmark habeas decision. Whether it was a departure from former
16 372 U.S. 391, 409 (1963).
17 Id. at 450-51 (dissenting opinion).
18 Supra note 5.
19 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
20 E.g., In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891).
21 See Andrews v. Swartz, 156 US. 272 (1895).
22 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
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practice, however, provokes another Brennan-Harlan disagreement.
The state prisoner in Frank had his federal claim (a charge that his
trial had been mob-dominated and therefore no trial at all within the
meaning of due process) considered, investigated, and rejected on the
facts by the highest state court. The Supreme Court held that the
latter determination accorded defendant his full measure of due process
and that the same claim could not be renewed in federal habeas pro-
ceedings. This ruling obviously confounds Justice Brennan's view that
the exhaustion requirement postponed, but never foreclosed, collateral
review in the federal courts, while it is further support for Justice
Harlan's contention that not every assertion of violated federal rights
compelled inquiry on habeas. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
the complaint in Frank was not of mere error or even of mere constitu-
tional error. It was nothing less than an allegation that the defendant's
trial was a lynching disguised as a legal proceeding. For a Court pre-
pared to treat as jurisdictional such things as the constitutionality of
the criminal charge, it would have been easy, and much more accurate
in a technical sense, to say that Frank's claim did relate to the jurisdic-
tion of the convicting court and, being based on the federal constitu-
tion, warranted consideration in the federal courts. Such in fact was the
position taken in several cases after Frank.2"
But to say that the federal question presented in Frank v.
Mangum was of that limited albeit ill-defined class of questions tradi-
tionally subject to collateral federal review is not to say that the
decision is indefensible. On the contrary, Frank has its defenders. One
of them is Professor Paul Bator, in whose estimation Frank is a prime
example of the sensible use of federal habeas corpus.24 It is not the
mere assertion of a federal claim, says Bator, which justifies a post-
conviction proceeding before a federal judge; it is only the assertion
of a federal claim which has not been adjudicated in a fair and ade-
quate state court hearing. Put another way, traditional habeas practice
involves an inquiry into the adequacy of the state process, and when
that inquiry is concluded in favor of the state that is, and should be,
the end of the matter. The argument is that the touchstone, "lack of
jurisdiction," is another, perhaps more elliptic way of expressing the
same thought, as is the companion phrase that habeas "will not be
allowed to do service for an appeal." In these terms Frank v. Mangum
23 House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945) (coerced guilty plea); Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935) (prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony); Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob domination of trial).
24 Bator, "Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,"
76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 486-87 (1963).
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can be justified; for if the question for the federal court was not
whether the prisoner had received a fair trial but whether his appeal
on the issue of fair trial had itself been fairly heard and decided in the
state supreme court, there is only one answer and the writ served its
traditional function in providing that answer.
With the Bator analysis it is also possible to harmonize the post-
Frank cases. For example, in Moore v. Dempsey,25 where the federal
habeas court did reach the merits of a claim of mob domination of the
petitioner's trial, there appears to have been no meaningful examina-
tion of the claim in any prior state court proceeding. Accepting the
Harlan-Bator understanding of the original practice on federal habeas
corpus, one comes to the conclusion that collateral review performed
a function quite different from and far more modest than appellate
review. The writ assured only that federal claims would be heard fairly
-if not in the state courts, then by default in a federal forum. The
writ did not, however, serve as an instrument for the correction of
errors committed in the context of fair judicial proceedings in the
states; for that the remedy lay solely in a writ of error to the United
States Supreme Court.
However one choses to read the cases of the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, there is no doubt that the 1953 decision in Brown
v. Allen26 demolished Ex parte Watkins, Frank v. Mangum, and a host
of other habeas landmarks. The Court held in Brown that it was
proper, indeed mandatory, for the lower federal courts on habeas to
pass on the merits of federal claims which the state courts had already
considered, weighed, and rejected-not merely some federal questions,
not only questions relating to the jurisdiction of the state courts, but
any and all questions of federal law. The issues presented in Brown's
case (coerced confession and racial discrimination in the selection of
jurors) were not of the kind theretofore recognized as proper subjects
for habeas. They were not jurisdictional, even in the untidiest use of
the term,27 and in addition they had been determined conscientiously
and dispassionately both in the trial court and in the North Carolina
Supreme Court.
If erroneous, those determinations were correctible by the process
of direct review in the United States Supreme Court.28 Of course Su-
25 Supra note 23.
26 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
27 See cases of racial exclusion from juries, supra notes 20 and 21. But for the view
that the proceedings are fatally polluted when a coerced confession is introduced see note
53, infra, and accompanying text.
28 Certiorari in fact had been requested and refused. Brown v. North Carolina, 341
U.S. 943 (1951). Such application was then a requisite step in exhaustion of "state"
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preme Court review of anything is not easily obtained; the jurisdiction
is almost entirely discretionary, the time and energies of the Justices
are, it goes without saying, limited, and the criteria for selection of
cases generally have little to do with the distress of a litigant. More-
over, the processing of criminal cases through the state courts does not
always bring the federal issues into a focus sharp enough for the
Supreme Court's unique purposes. A well-developed record, clear find-
ings of fact, and thorough exploration of the issues in the courts below
are weighty considerations even if they are not formal prerequisites to
the granting of certiorari. This is as it should be in a court whose most
important function is to pronounce the Law for the benefit of the nation
primarily and for the contesting parties only incidentally." Another
consequence of its special role is that the Court will not necessarily
hear all the federal claims raised in a single litigation but may limit its
review to one question deemed more compelling or more timely than
the others. This means that a decision adverse to the petitioner oper-
ates as an affirmance of the judgment below, despite the possibility
that the judgment might, on plenary review, turn out to be infected
with other reversible errors.30
Thus in the absence of collateral proceedings in lower federal
courts, the fate of a state criminal defendant is likely to be entirely in
the hands of the state judiciary. This, as was said at the outset, is the
situation for many civil litigants who have federal claims to press. But
to the Court in Brown v. Allen it was not an acceptable state of affairs
when life or liberty are at stake nor, as the Court saw it, was it re-
sponsive to the will of Congress as expressed in the 1867 Act to limit
the writ of habeas to a narrower range of questions than are cognizable
on certiorari or appeal. In short, Brown equates habeas with direct
review. If a state prisoner cannot interest the Supreme Court in hearing
his claims, he can take them to the nearest federal district court, where
a hearing is assured.
II. EFFECT OF STATE PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
The petitioner in Brown pursued every avenue of redress in the
state courts, and only then did he turn to the federal court. But suppose
for one reason or another a habeas petitioner has omitted a state
remedial step. What is the effect on his eligibility for habeas? An
remedies. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950),
overruled in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
29 Hart, "The Time Chart of the justices," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1959).
30 Cf. the limited grant of certiorari in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928).
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answer was supplied in Daniels v. Allen,"' a companion case to Brown
and identical save in one respect: Daniels' appeal from conviction had
been dismissed by the state supreme court for late filing. The immedi-
ate question was whether Daniels had satisfied the requirement of
exhaustion of state remedies-a requirement which originated, as we
have noted, in nineteenth century cases and which was codified into
the Habeas Act in 1948.2 Did the requirement relate only to those
state remedies open to a prisoner at the time of his federal proceeding
(and for Daniels there were none) or did it include remedies formerly
available but now time-barred? The Court held that state "remedies"
meant past as well as present opportunities for relief from imprison-
ment. Daniels' botched appeal therefore cost him his right to federal
habeas corpus.
The purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is understandable enough.
There is no reason to presume that a prisoner inevitably will fail to
secure redress in the state courts. If anything the presumption is just
the reverse: that courts generally recognize meritorious claims when
they are presented. Habeas, to be sure, exists for those cases in which
error has not been corrected, but respect for the basic soundness of
state processes-and considerations too of the federal courts' own vol-
ume of business--dictate that the writ be kept in reserve as a last
resort. Furthermore, it would seem to be in the selfish interest of state
prisoners to pursue as many avenues of redress as the law affords. The
most they have to lose is time. Of course, to a prisoner time spent in
jail means a great deal; and to those-probably their numbers are
legion-who have no confidence in state court justice, the exhaustion
requirement no doubt seems a perverse device for prolonging unjust
detention. While a prisoner's Weltansicht obviously furnishes no rea-
son for waiving the requirement, it should alert the federal court to the
possibility of attempts at circumvention. Thus one can appreciate the
necessity of disqualifying habeas petitioners who have deliberately
neglected to pursue state remedies to which it is now too late to return.
But that is not a fair description of the petitioner in Daniels. He did
not intentionally abandon his state remedies in order to accelerate a
hearing in federal court; he was, after all, under a death sentence and
stood to gain additional months of life by protracting his litigation. His
sin-and not really his but his attorney's-was to serve the appeal
papers by hand one day after the period for review as of right had
expired. Making Daniels' predicament even more sympathetic is the
fact that under local law his appeal would have been effective if the
31 Reported sub nom. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
32 28 U..C. § 2254 (1964).
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papers had been placed in the mail on the last day, though they would
not have been received any sooner. Tested against the purposes as-
cribed to the exhaustion doctrine, Daniels imposed a sanction, forfei-
ture of habeas, all out of proportion to his procedural offense.
But there is another way of looking at the decision. The state
court's dismissal of Daniels' appeal rested on a rule of state law which
had nothing whatever to do with the merits or demerits of the federal
claims. It has long been the practice of the Supreme Court to reject
appeals from state courts when decision of the federal questions can
have no effect on the outcome. "We do not attempt to settle the dis-
pute," the Court has said, "where the judgment of a state court rests
upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other nonfederal in
character.13 3 At the very least, this doctrine of independent nonfederal
grounds is a rule of self-limitation. However, there are arguments to
support the view that the doctrine is a constitutional restriction on the
powers of the Court.34 If the local rule of procedural default applied
by the North Carolina court in Daniels' case was a tenable ground for
sustaining the conviction despite the possibility of federal error in
rulings of the trial court ("tenable" in this context is a term of art,
discussed in some detail below)," review by appeal or certiorari in the
Supreme Court was precluded. So in refusing habeas, the Court may
have been ruling that the federal district courts cannot grant relief to
a state prisoner who does not qualify for aid on direct review." On
this view, Daniels and Brown v. Allen are opposite sides of the same
coin, for just as Brown broadened the writ of habeas corpus to a point
coterminous with Supreme Court appellate review of questions of fed-
eral law, Daniels fastened onto the writ a limitation associated with
direct review.
How limiting is that limitation? In order to foreclose review, the
state ground must satisfy two requirements. The first is that it is genu-
inely independent of the merits of the federal issues. This is a matter
of the state court's intention as revealed by its opinion. In a much sim-
33 Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1935).
34 See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). Dissenting in Fay v. Noia, 372 US.
at 463-66, Mr. Justice Harlan planted the doctrine squarely on Article HI grounds.
35 See text pp. 55-56.
36 Although the general tenor of the opinion suggests that the foremost concern of
the Court was interpretation of the exhaustion requirement, Mr. Justice Reed did say:
"[A] United States district court, with its familiarity with state practice is in a favor-
able position to recognize adequate state grounds in denials of relief by state courts with-
out opinion. A fortiori, where the state action was based on an adequate state ground,
no further examination is required, unless no state remedy for the deprivation of federal
constitutional rights ever existed." Daniels v. Allen, reported sub nom. Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).
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plified way, it can be said that independent nonfederal grounds are
presented in three types of opinions: (1) those in which the state
court expressly refuses to consider the federal issues; (2) those
wherein the federal points actually are decided in favor of a litigant
who nevertheless loses his case on state grounds (in which event the
federal-law rulings technically are dictum), and (3) opinions in which
the federal as well as the state questions are resolved against a litigant,
but the court's expressions concerning federal law are unnecessary to
decision and constitute either obiter or alternative grounds. State
courts, however, do not always compose their opinions in ways which
make it easy for a federal court to determine the outcome-significance
of the state grounds. Sometimes it may be a matter of arriere-pensee,
but more often the simple truth is that the state judges have not sorted
out in their own minds the relationship between the federal and state
questions. That is especially likely to be the case when a party fails on
both grounds, for whether the grounds are severable or interdependent
--. e., whether situation (3) is presented-does not become critical
until review is sought in a federal court37
In addition to the requirement of independence, a state ground
must qualify as "adequate" or "tenable" if it is to prevent federal
court review. Whereas the severability of the state ground is itself a
judgment belonging to the state court, the sufficiency of the ground is
a question for the federal court. Were it otherwise, state courts could
insulate their judgments from federal review by resort to, or invention
of, local rules of the most tendentious kind. But there are as yet no
clear standards of definition for "adequacy." A rule of state law which,
standing alone or in application, offends the federal constitution obvi-
ously cannot constitute a sufficient nonfederal ground. In Daniels v.
Allen, in fact, the Court skirmished over the constitutionality of the
North Carolina court's refusal to exercise its discretion to entertain
a slightly delayed appeal in a death-sentence case--"an act so arbitrary
and so cruel in its operation," according to Justice Frankfurter in
dissent, "that in the circumstances of this case it constitutes a denial
of due process in its rudimentary procedural aspect.""8 But no one in
37 An example is Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959), where the state appellate court
indicated that rejection of the prisoner's appeal was warranted by a rule of local law,
but proceeded nevertheless to examine and reject the federal contentions on their merits.
When the same contentions were renewed thereafter on federal habeas corpus, the Supreme
Court divided sharply on characterization of the state ground.
38 344 US. 443, 557-58 (1953). Also casting the question in constitutional terms, a
majority of the Court reached the opposite conclusion: "We cannot say that North
Carolina's action in refusing to review after failure to perfect the case on appeal violates
the federal constitution." Id. at 486 (per Reed, J.).
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Daniels spoke to the question whether a state ruling which is not
unconstitutional is eo ipso adequate. 9 However, one commentator has
suggested that a state court may have constitutionally sufficient rea-
sons for passing over federal claims which a federal court, for inde-
pendent and constitutionally sufficient reasons of its own, should hear.4'
The immediate objection to this position is, of course, that disregard
of the state ground undercuts what by hypothesis is legitimate state
policy. To undercut, though, is not necessarily to destroy. In Daniels,
for example, the loss of appeal to the highest state court is a serious
sanction for tardiness and one which should effectively chasten future
litigants even if the Supreme Court (or a habeas court) in the end is
prepared to accept the case. Should anyone willfully seek to capitalize
on differences between state and federal court ideas of reviewability,
the federal court in that event can and should use its own devices to
cope with such triffing. With respect to Daniels, then, the independent
nonfederal ground doctrine no more justifies the disposition than did
the Court's interpretation of the exhaustion requirement.
The equivalence of habeas and appeal, never a perfect 1:1 ratio
since the collateral remedy offered superior factfinding possibilities,'
was rejected altogether a mere decade after Brown and Daniels. In
39 Nor was the question addressed by any member of the Court in Irvin v. Dowd,
supra note 37, although Justice Brennan did say somewhat cryptically that "we do not
reach the question whether federal habeas corpus would have been available to the pe-
titioner had the Indiana Supreme Court rested its decision on the escape ground." 359
U.S. 394, 406.
40 Hart, supra note 29, at 116 nn.94, 95.
41 In form habeas corpus is an original civil action set in a trial court, which is em-
powered and equipped, as appellate tribunals are not, to receive the oral testimony of
witnesses. Brown v. Allen established the authority of the federal habeas court to retry
on independent proofs all relevant issues of fact, even though the same issues had pre-
viously been resolved in the state courts. However, only in "unusual circumstances" or
upon discovery of a "vital flaw" in the state factfinding process was exercise of the
power declared to be a mandatory duty of the habeas judge. 344 U.S. 443, 463-64, 506
(1953). The actions of the lower federal courts in the following decade evince no epidemic
of "flaws" or "unusual circumstances," nor were the federal judges eager to relifigate
questions of fact when refusal to do so would not have been reversible error. But see
Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 935 (1956).
The decision in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), implied that flawed state
factfinding in connection with a question of federal right was itself a denial of due
process which required the prisoner's discharge on habeas, subject to corrective action
in the state court. But Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), restored (with detailed
elaboration) the teaching of Brown v. Allen relative to the factfinding chore in the habeas
court. The restoration proved short-lived, for in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964),
the Court once more seemed to equate inadequate state factfinding machinery with denial
of due process. See Wright & Sofaer, "Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The
Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility," 75 Yale L.J. 895 (1966).
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view of the repugnance of the Daniels' result, it is not surprising that
the new point of departure was the nonfederal ground doctrine. The
Court held in Fay v. Noia42 that limitations on direct Supreme Court
review occasioned by procedural default in the state courts do not
"limit the power granted the federal courts under the federal habeas
statute." The quintessential difference between habeas and appellate
review, we are told, is that the former tests legality of detention "sim-
pliciter" while the latter determines only the supportability of the
judgment of the lower court. Consequently there are areas in which
habeas and appeal do not coincide. Direct review may lie, though
habeas will not, where the petitioner is not in custody." Conversely,
says Noia, habeas will lie where the applicant is held in violation of
his federal rights, although the judgment which authorizes his im-
prisonment cannot be upset on direct review. Stringent rules of waiver
or default, and even rules of inexcusable neglect, which are not nor-
mally considered harsh or excessive and which have counterparts in
federal criminal procedure,44 present no obstacle to the habeas remedy.
Nothing less than "deliberate bypass" of the "orderly procedure of
the state courts" must be shown (the burden being on the state) before
the federal court can close its doors to a state prisoner. And even such
a showing will not prevent the federal court from disregarding the by-
pass if it so wishes.
Doctrinally, Noia is a new broom which sweeps broadly, for al-
though the relevance of the independent nonfederal ground to habeas
had not been clearly articulated in Daniels, it had been taken for
granted. In strictly quantitative effect, however, Noia may not be
as revolutionary as its holding would appear to indicate. The powers
of the federal habeas court are enhanced only to the extent that rules
42 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963).
43 But cf. Martin v. Virginia, 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1964), criticized in Note, 1966
Duke L.J. 588, but approved in Note, 26 Md. L. Rev. 79 (1966). Full service of sentence
renders a case moot for purposes of direct as well as collateral review. Parker v. Ellis, 362
U.S. 574 (1960). Compare Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
44 E.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) (requiring motion to suppress evidence to be brought
before trial on pain of waiver of objection). See United States v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697
(2d Cir.) (alternate ground), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 933 (1963).
4; See notes 36 and 37, supra. However, the language quoted from Irvin v. Dowd,
supra note 39, could be understood as a portent of Noia. At least one commentator after
Irvin urged rejection of the independent state ground doctrine in habeas cases. Reitz,
"Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding," 74 Harv. L. Rev.
1315 (1961), and in a lecture delivered after Irvin, Mr. Justice Brennan expressed his
own doubts as to the relevance of direct-review limitations to collateral proceedings,
"Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism," 7 Utah L. Rev.
423, 435-36 (1961).
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of state procedure do in fact preclude direct review in the Supreme
Court, and while that is a matter of no little moment, its practical
significance is to be measured by the readiness of the Court to accept
the "adequacy" of the state procedural ground in a given case. There
is reason to believe that the Court is considerably more sensitive nowa-
days to the matter of review limitation than it was at the time of
Daniels. In Noia itself, for example, the Court was not prepared to say
that the petitioner's failure to appeal his conviction to the state appel-
late court when he had the chance was a default grave enough to fore-
stall review in the United States Supreme Court.46 Although he did not
elaborate on the point, Justice Brennan, the majority spokesman,
could well have been wondering what worthwhile state interest was
served by treating unappealed convictions as final, when another rule
of state practice permitted unlimited reargument of cases previously
disposed of by appeal as well as access to such local post-conviction
remedies as coram nobis.47 The latter rule refutes any claim that the
former is based on considerations of economy of judicial effort or on
an interest in detecting error soon enough to make retrial feasible. If
anything, the provision for renewal of former appeals bespeaks a reali-
zation that the law can change over time and a desire to allow prisoners
to take advantage of such changes. Where, therefore, a rule of pro-
cedure does not form part of an integrated, consistent state policy, it
would not be farfetched-and it may be what Justice Brennan had in
mind-to hold that the rule is not an adequate nonfederal ground.48
Nor is it enough for a state to demonstrate that its procedural
46 372 U.S. 391, 429: "[A] question on which we intimate no view." But cf. Parker
v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
47 Noia and two co-defendants had been convicted of murder by the New York
court in 1942. The co-defendants appealed but Noia did not. Although the convictions
were affirmed, one of the defendants ultimately procured his release on federal habeas
corpus, United States ex ref. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955), after two
unsuccessful motions for reargument of the original decision of the New York Court of
Appeals, People v. Caminito, 297 N.Y. 882, 79 N.E.2d 277 (1948); 307 N.Y. 686, 120
N.E.2d 857 (1954). Thereafter the other co-defendant secured reversal of his conviction,
by motion for reargument, People v. Bonino, 1 N.Y.2d 752, 152 N.Y.S.2d 298, 135
NE.2d 51 (1956), despite an earlier failure on a similar motion, 296 N.Y. 1004, 73 N.E.2d
579 (1947). In Noia's case, however, the failure to appeal in the first instance was held to
bar relief on coram nobis. People v. Noia, 3 Misc. 2d 447, 158 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Kings
County 1956), rev'd, 4 App. Div. 2d 698, 163 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1957), aff'd sub nom. People
v. Caminito, 3 N.Y.2d 596, 170 N.Y.S.2d 799, 148 NX.2d 139, cert. denied sub nom.
Noia v. New York, 357 U.S. 905 (1958).
48 The New York court subsequently expanded coram nobis to accommodate claims
founded on Jackson v. Denno, supra note 41. See People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255
N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965), recognized as an exhaustible state remedy, United
States ex rel. Martin v. McMann, 348 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1965).
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rule serves an intelligible and legitimate state policy in the abstract if
a specific application is unwarranted. Thus in Henry v. Mississippi49
the Court could find no fault with the state's contemporaneous objec-
tion requirement, under which an objection to the introduction of evi-
dence was deemed waived unless interposed at the time the evidence
was offered. But its own independent analysis of the record at trial led
the Court to the tentative conclusion that the purposes of the state
rule had been "substantially served," so that as applied by the Missis-
sippi court the rule did not constitute an adequate nonfederal ground
for sustaining the conviction. ° That conclusion, as Justice Harlan
demonstrated in his dissent, was based on some wobbly if not disin-
genuous logic.5 But that is not the whole point. We could concede,
though the majority of the Court did not, that every reason which
supports the Mississippi waiver rule demanded its application in
Henry, and still we might approve the Court's action. For even if Su-
preme Court review of the substantive federal issues necessarily and
seriously impairs the efficacy of the state's contemporaneous objection
requirement, there may be weightier countervailing interests of a fed-
eral character. Respect for state procedural doctrine is optional, not
imperative, and has no bearing on the authority of federal courts to
fashion their own rules for the protection of federal rights. A federally-
fashioned waiver rule applicable to objections founded on federal law
might strike a different balance than the Mississippi rule, even if the
49 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
GO The issue was held in abeyance pending determination on remand of the
suggestion that defense counsel may purposefully have refrained from objecting for
tactical reasons. If that proved to be the case, the constitutional claim would be forfeited,
not only for purposes of direct Supreme Court review but also in a federal habeas
proceeding unless the district judge chose, as a matter of grace, to overlook the "bypass.'
51 While the majority acknowledged that the Mississippi rule "dearly does serve a
legitimate state interest," 379 U.S. at 448, the fact that the defendant had presented his
search-and-seizure claim in a motion for directed verdict at the close of the state's case
in chief was viewed as a sufficient substitute for contemporaneous objection. However,
justice Harlan showed that the constitutional claim-which was by no means self-
evident-was buried in the directed verdict motion and was not argued orally; thus
there was lacking the focused attention which contemporaneous objection assures. One
might add another criticism of the majority decision, viz., that an immediate objection
permits the admissibility of testimony to be determined before the jury hears the witness'
response. An after-the-fact motion is not truly curative; indeed a jury's mere exposure
to unconstitutional evidence can offend due process. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964). Unless the Court in Henry meant to apply the concept of harmless error to
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment-and the Court expressly reserved
that question, 379 U.S. at 449 n.6-it is bard to perceive how a motion to strike or a
cautionary instruction to the jury can undo the harm caused by failure to interpose an
anticipatory objection.
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latter is not, under latitudinarian standards of due process, "unreason-
able."
As Justice Harlan showed, enforcement of the state contemporane-
ous objection rule in Henry was rationally calculated to promote some
undeniably desirable objectives. The first and most important reason
for the rule is to avoid needless appeals and retrials by insisting that
the judge presiding at the original trial be given a fair opportunity to
exclude improper evidence before it infects the proceedings (to say
nothing of affording the prosecutor the chance to withdraw the chal-
lenged evidence). A secondary but not insignificant purpose is to secure
for the reviewing court the benefit of the trial judge's explanation
should the objection be overruled.52 The intended effect of such a
rule of waiver, rigorously enforced, is not so much punitive as pro-
phylactic; the expectation being that attorneys in future cases will
neither intentionally nor inadvertently invite error by failing to raise
their objections promptly. In this manner Mississippi made the judg-
ment that the ends of justice in the generality of cases are best served
by its waiver-of-objection rule.
However, a different set of considerations supports a much less
rigorous rule. The first premise might be that even competent attorneys
sometimes make honest and inadvertent mistakes, and that notice of
adverse consequences does not insure against negligent or accidental
omissions. Then apart from the question of deterrent effectiveness,
there is a question of elementary fairness to the defendant. Is it right
to charge a lawyer's oversight to his client when the consequence for
the client is imprisonment or even death, while for the lawyer it is
merely remorse? Moreover in some cases the improper admission of
evidence so prejudices the process of guilt determination as to render
the total trial unfair.53 The right of fair trial is hardly something that
should be forfeited inadvertently or waived by proxy. Even for con-
stitutional errors of lesser gravity, the public interests served by cor-
rection of the error can, on a national value scale, be deemed superior
to the interests which are served by an airtight waiver doctrine. 4 From
52 It cannot be denied that trial judges (inspired perhaps by Lord Mansfield's
famous advice) ordinarily do not explain their rulings on objections to evidence. But
where the objection is founded on the Constitution, the compulsion to explain is
greater. Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
53 The admission of coerced confessions is held to have that effect. Lynumn v.
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
54 Thus a finding of illegal search and seizure serves to vindicate the right of privacy
and to deter future unlawful intrusions, even if the use of the evidence was in nowise
unfair to the defendant. But cf. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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the foregoing elements it is possible to construct an independent federal
doctrine of waiver quite different from that on which Mr. Henry came
a cropper in the state courts. It could take several forms, including at
the outer extreme an absolute principle that federal objections are un-
waivable. If the Court's disposition in Henry is any indication, how-
ever, some intentional waivers will be accepted and treated as irrevers-
ibleY What constitutes "intent," whose intention is relevant: the
lawyer's or the client's, and where the burden of proving waiver lies
are matters of further refinement on which Henry offers some addi-
tional, though not definitive, advice.
In a more recent case the Court said: "The question of a waiver of
a federally' guaranteed constitutional right is, of course, a federal
question controlled by federal law.""ea So unexceptional was the propo-
sition thought to be that the words "of course" were used. Had the
same proposition been the starting point for decision in Henry, or in
Noia, much of the present brouhaha about the powers of federal
reviewing courts might have been avoided. Unhappily, even members
of the Supreme Court are not free from the tyranny of words. The
phrase "adequate nonfederal ground" directs the mind along the path of
timidity and deference to local jurisprudence, and where sound in-
stincts rebel the result is likely to be a neurotic reaction. Perhaps this
may be the explanation for the majority opinion in Henry. At any rate,
we can agree with Justice Harlan that direct Supreme Court review
seems to have been liberated from state procedural constraints almost,
if not wholly, to the same degree as federal habeas corpus. Which is to
say that the Brown-Daniels v. Allen equation between the two forms of
review still has validity, albeit on a scale of mutual enlargement.
III. THE OBLIGATION OF THE STATES TO HEAR FEDERAL CLAIMS
If, as the Court now seems to recognize, there is a federal power
to prescribe the conditions for waiver of federal rights, should not the
power be exercised pre-emptively? It is intensely uncomfortable-and
this is the point of the dissent in Henry v. Mississippi-to disregard for
purposes of federal court review a state procedural system which is
"legitimate" enough to continue functioning in the state courts. Those
states with stricter requirements of procedure might, it is true, be
induced to change their ways by the knowledge that failure to do so
will not bar federal court review and in fact will hasten it. But that is
not reform by example; it is reform by blackmail, and it is not, as
55 See note 50, supra.
56 Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
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Justice Harlan said, "congenial to the kind of federalism I had sup-
posed was ours. 57
Ultimately the Court will have to answer this question: Are the
reasons which impel federal courts to entertain constitutional claims
despite the defendant's failure to raise a prompt objection (as in
Henry) or to pursue a timely appeal (as in Daniels and Noia) reasons
which are rooted in due process, or are they only reactions of a more
sensitive federal conscience? If the former, the states violate the
fourteenth amendment when they refuse to hear claims which the
Supreme Court or federal habeas judges will entertain, and the remedy
for that violation is to set aside the defendant's conviction instanter
and without regard to the merit of the claims that were unjustifiably
forfeited.
It is a recognized principle that the states have a constitutional
duty to adjudicate federal questions when Congress commands.", It is
also true that in the enforcement of federal statutory rights the states
may be obliged to subordinate their own procedures to the practices of
federal courts.59 Can we not deduce from these principles a require-
ment that the state courts rule on constitutional questions arising out
of or in the course of criminal proceedings, and that they do so in
compliance with procedural ground rules set by the Supreme Court?
The authority to establish procedural conditions for the adjudication of
federal claims is, it would appear, a corollary of the Court's authority
to define rights under the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court's confession cases are instructive in this con-
nection. First it was held that the fourteenth amendment prohibits the
use of coerced confessions as evidence of guilt.6 0 This exclusionary rule
soon was reinforced by decisions holding that introduction of an in-
voluntary confession cannot be condoned as harmless error, whatever
may be the sufficiency of other proofs of guilt."1 Then after three dec-
ades of confession cases, the Court held in Jackson v. Denno62 that
the fourteenth amendment requires a full determination of all questions
of law and fact relating to voluntariness before a confession can be
submitted to a trial jury. Each of these rulings was derived from the
due process clause, each was "procedural" in one sense or another, and
in each instance the question before the Court was not whether the
state judges had acted arbitrarily but whether they had done as much
as they should to protect the defendant's underlying right to be free
57 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 465 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
58 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
59 Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
60 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
61 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), and cases cited in note 53, supra.
62 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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from police brutality or duress. 3 Would it be an unnatural progression
from these rulings to forbid the state courts to forfeit a defendant's
constitutional claims, except perhaps when he has wantonly and de-
liberately abused fair rules of orderly procedure?
Of course, a "federalization" of state procedures under the au-
thority of the fourteenth amendment need not go this far. There is a
qualitative difference between a state remedial system which will hear
a constitutional claim provided only that the party asserting the claim
complies with reasonable rules of legal procedure and a state regime
which fails to provide any process at all. The affirmative obligation to
supply process was the issue on which certiorari was granted in Case v.
Nebraska,64 in the same term of Court that produced Henry v. Missis-
sippi. But before the case was argued the Nebraska legislature enacted
a new post-conviction remedy statute,65 causing the Court, on grounds
of probable mootness, to withhold decision. The statutory reform was
warmly applauded in separate opinions by Justices Clark and Brennan
as a step in the direction of harmonious federal-state relations. It would
be unfair, however, to suppose that the Justices were telegraphing
their punches on the constitutional issue. Nor, as we have suggested,
would a decision adverse to the state necessarily have meant the end
of state rules of waiver or forfeiture of federal claims less permissive
than the rules governing Supreme Court review or federal habeas cor-
pus.
Johnson v. New Jersey,6 6 decided only last June, discourages pre-
diction of the hasty demise of local waiver doctrine. The defendant
sought Supreme Court review of collateral state proceedings, asserting
alternative claims: first, that the rulings in Escobedo67 and Miranda8
should be applied retrospectively to void his conviction, and second,
that even under the pre-Escobedo standard of voluntariness his con-
fession should not have been admitted in evidence. After rejecting the
first claim on the merits and announcing that the new rules for police
interrogation were to be applied prospectively, the Court refused to
consider the second. The coerced confession claim had been rejected
in previous state post-conviction proceedings as well as in a federal
habeas hearing. The defendant then had renewed the claim in the state
court, asserting additional facts never alleged in any of the earlier
proceedings. Invoking a rule of state procedure, the state refused to
63 Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
64 331 U.S. 336 (1965).
65 Neb. Laws ch. 145, § 1 (1965).
Co 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
67 Escobedo v. Illlnois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
68 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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consider the new allegations. It was in this posture that the matter
reached the Supreme Court. The decision of the state court was held
to rest on "an adequate state ground which precludes us from testing
the coerced confession claim on the present review, whatever may be
the significance of the state court's reliance on its procedural rule in
federal habeas corpus proceedings." 9
If Fay v. Noia would compel a federal court to hear the claim on
habeas, Johnson indeed is a most disquieting case. For it would mean
not only that federal habeas practice does not set the standards of
procedural due process in the state courts, but also that direct Supreme
Court review of state criminal judgments is shut off by "reasonable"
local rules of procedure-the implications of Henry v. Mississippi to
the contrary notwithstanding. It is hard to believe that Johnson indi-
cates such a total regression. Not even a habeas court is obliged to act
on repetitious or vexatious petitions or to "sanction needless piecemeal
presentation of constitutional claims,"7 0 and while there was no specific
proof of bad faith, the Court may perhaps have had cause for sus-
picion. 71 In any event, that is a question of fact which is just as unsuit-
able for determination by the Supreme Court as was the suggestion of
tactical failure to object in Henry. Nor should too much significance be
given to the Court's failure to remand Johnson to the state court for
proof that the petitioner deliberately hoarded his contention, as it did
in Henry, for it was the Escobedo and Miranda retroactivity question
and not the Henry-Noia problem that demanded and received the
Court's primary attention.
72
It is still too soon to say with any assurance that the Court will
or will not tolerate a double standard of procedure for the presentation
of constitutional claims. Perhaps the lower federal courts need more
time to digest and decrassify the "deliberate bypass" doctrine for
69 384 U.S. 719, 735-36 (1966).
70 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963).
71 Not until Escobedo was decided did the petitioner allege denial of access to counsel
and relatives. These plainly were not newly-discovered facts, although it is conceivable
that petitioner was unaware of their legal significance before Escobedo. Even so, his
subsequent post-conviction petition may not have asserted a new "ground" as the term
is defined for federal remedies. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963). If
a federal habeas court could properly have dismissed the follow-up petition without further
inquiry, New Jersey procedure is not comparatively more restrictive.
72 Note also that in Henry the defendant's sentence apparently was stayed pending
direct review. For the Supreme Court to have dismissed certiorari and remitted the
petitioner to his habeas remedy would have required that he go to jail as a condition of
further litigating. But see Martin v. Virginia, supra note 43. In Johnson, the defendant
already was in prison and was seeking Supreme Court review of collateral state proceedings,
so that the need for such review in preference to habeas was emotionally less impelling.
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habeas cases and to work out its implications for federal criminal pro-
cedure before it can be decided whether to transfer the doctrine bodily
to the states. Perhaps too the Court is waiting for the states to respond
to the invitation to procedural relaxation which it issued in Case v.
Nebraska.7 Meanwhile, however, federal habeas, and in some instances
Supreme Court appellate review of state decisions, offers many ag-
grieved state prisoners the only remedy they will find.
IV. THE ImPLICATIONS OF HABEAS FOR STATE JUSTICE
The history of federal habeas corpus in the last decade is a history
of enlargement. Today it is not inaccurate to say that virtually every
state criminal conviction which results in imprisonment and which
involves an allegation of constitutional infraction is reviewable in the
lower federal courts. Were the motive force behind the expansion of
habeas to its present proportions a skeptical opinion of the quality of
justice being dispensed in the state courts, the state judges would have
good reason for resentment and indignation. But it is difficult to believe
that modern habeas practice can be explained on no other assumption.
Unfortunately the Court has yet fully to articulate the bases for its
expansive interpretations of the Habeas Corpus Act.
In seeking to develop justifications, it is helpful to distinguish two
categories of cases in which federal court review is made available to
state prisoners. The first is exemplified by Brown v. Allen. There the
lower federal courts were directed to re-do what the highest state court
had already done, i.e., to determine the merit of the petitioner's federal
claims. This is habeas in its most controversial form, for the district
judge serves as nothing less than a one-man Supreme Court reviewing
the decisions of the highest state appellate tribunal. The case against
Brown v. Allen has been developed most fully by Professor Bator.74 He
argues that the right of the Supreme Court to rule on the correctness of
a state court's application of federal law is not in the nature of things
delegable to an inferior federal court. The Supreme Court's pronounce-
ment constitutes a "correct" statement of constitutional law only be-
cause the Court is supreme: no other tribunal sits in review of its de-
cisions.75 A court of last resort is not by hypothesis superior in ability
73 See Brennan, "Some Aspects of Federalism," 39 N.Y.ULT. Rev. 945, 957-58 (1964) ;
Meador, "Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Postconviction Review,"
50 A.BAJ. 928 (1964).
74 Bator, supra note 24.
75 Writing for himself in Brown v. Allen, Mr. Justice Jackson said: "[R]eversal
by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. There is no doubt
that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of
state courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we
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or integrity, but superior only in authority. "Error" accordingly is a
deviation from authoritative decisions of the highest court in the hier-
archy of courts. Beyond producing uniformity in the decision of like
cases, there is nothing intrinsic to a system of judicial review which
assures correct decision in any ideal sense-a truth of which we are
reminded each time a precedent is overruled.76
Thus it is argued that habeas review is not and cannot be a prac-
tical substitute for direct review by certiorari or appeal, simply because
lower federal courts can offer no further assurance of correct decision
either in the ideal sense or in terms of conformity to authoritative Su-
preme Court pronouncements. In cases like Brown v. Allen, Bator
maintains, there is as much chance that the federal habeas judge will
be wrong in his understanding of the law as there is that the state
supreme court erred in its interpretation. Only if it were assumed
that state courts, including the state appellate bench, are generally less
faithful in their adherence to or less competent in their understanding
of controlling federal law than are the lower federal judges would
Brown make sense to that commentator. In other words, only a higher
quotient of error (defined as deviation from authoritative Supreme
Court pronouncements) in the state courts logically could justify re-
litigation in the federal district court. This, of course, is the assumption
which incenses the state judiciary: first, because it demands documen-
tation and the experience since Brown has not revealed so significant
an incidence of release of state prisoners on habeas as to substantiate
doubts concerning the probity or integrity of state judges; 7 second,
because such an assumption runs counter to the original scheme of the
are infallible only because we are final." 344 U.S. 443, 540 (concurring opinion). 137
years earlier, Justice Story had written: "From the very nature of things, the absolute
right of decision, in the last resort, must rest somewhere-wherever it may be vested it
is susceptible of abuse." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 345 (1816).
76 The Court's recent resort to the technique of prospective overruling-see Link-
letter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Tehan v. United States ex. rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406
(1966); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966)-bespeaks not only the belief that
higher courts for better or worse "make" law, but the uneasy concern that retrospective
change, given the indefinite availability of habeas corpus, can have extravagant and
untoward consequences. Compare the alternative of modifying customary habeas practice,
put forward by Mishkin, "The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time
and Law," 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56 (1965).
77 Lower federal court rulings on points of constitutional law, needless to say, are
often reversed by the Supreme Court. This is no less true of the federal courts in their
habeas capacity. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), reversing 271 F.2d 552
(7th Cir. 1959); Leyra. v. Denno, 347 U.S. 566 (1954), reversing 208 F.2d 605 (2d Cir.
1953).
78 Mr. Justice Clark places the figure for successful petitions between 1946 and 1957
at 1.47. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445 n.1 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
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Constitution which created only one indestructible federal court, the
Supreme Court, and perforce left open the possibility that the states
would play a largely autonomous role in the protection of federal
rights; 79 third, because despite Brown v. Allen, it is far from settled
that the decision of a question of federal law by a United States court
of appeals, much less a district court, constitutes a precedent binding
on the state courts within the same territorial jurisdiction; 0 and finally,
because the logical terminus of a belief that state judges are more
error-prone than federal judges is that the trial of defendants having
federal claims to present should be transferred to the federal courts in
the first place rather than re-opened after conviction-a position, how-
ever, which the Court has rejected.81
But reinquiry by habeas can be justified by considerations which
do not demean the state courts. Louis Jaffe has observed that "when
we want extra assurance we should not forfeit it for doctrinal purity."82
Bator's doctrinal purity might demand that decisions reached by the
state courts in fair hearings be accepted as final, absent review in the
Supreme Court. Extra assurance, however, suggests that still another
court take a look at the merit of defendant's claims.83 Even Professor
Bator admits that appellate review somehow does promote justice as
well as performing the neutral service of unifying the law;84 surely as
much can be said for collateral review. The most serious objection
concerns the cost of additional proceedings. The habeas jurisdiction
does require an enormous commitment of federal judicial resources, to
say nothing of the heavy burdens it imposes on state prosecuting
authorities, for what seems a marginal profit in terms of wrongs set
right.8 But if the continued imprisonment of a single defendant in
violation of his constitutional rights is "intolerable," as the Court in
Fay v. Noia said it was, then habeas needs no cost justification.
There is a second category of habeas claim which involves differ-
ent and perhaps more compelling reasons for inquiry by the federal
79 U.S. Const. art. MI, § 1. The debated alternatives are reported in Padover, To
Secure These Blessings 399-401 (1962). Cf. Hart, "The Relations Between State and
Federal Law," 54 Colum. L. Rev. 459, 507 (1954).
80 See Annot., 147 A.L.R. 857 (1943).
81 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
82 Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 635 (1965). The quoted state-
ment refers to the closely analogous situation of de novo judicial review of administrative
agency findings of "jurisdictional facts."
83 Consider California's provision for automatic appeal in death-sentence cases, Cal.
Pen. Code § 1239(b) (1956).
84 Bator, supra note 24, at 453, 473.
85 See Note, "The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions from State Prisoners,"
52 Va. L. Rev. 486 (1966).
1967]
68 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
courts. Many of the decisions discussed in this article, such as Daniels
v. Allen, Fay v. Noia, Case v. Nebraska, were cases in which the state
courts declined to consider a defendant's constitutional arguments for
procedural reasons. A federal hearing in these instances is not the kind
of repetitious litigation that Professor Bator finds offensive, and yet
it is here that the probability is greatest that the state prisoner will win
his release by the order of a federal judge. What is responsible, how-
ever, is the lesser willingness, not the lesser ability, of the state judges
to decide federal questions. Should the fourteenth amendment be con-
strued as imposing on the state courts an obligation to entertain a
prisoner's federal constitutional claims whenever such claims would
be cognizable on habeas, it would amount to a vote of confidence in
the ability of the state judges to render reliable decisions. Habeas, to
be sure, would remain open as an "extra assurance" warranted by the
importance of the constitutional rights in question; but the federal
remedy would truly be a supplement, not a reproach, to state justice.
